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I. INTRODUCTION
hese materials will highlight the most significant recent judicial de-
cisions and the 1997 legislative provisions which amend the Texas
Penal Code (Penal Code). A scattering of judicial decisions is in-
cluded, but the emphasis is on the legislation itself.
II. GENERAL PROVISIONS UNDER CHAPTER 1
This section discusses several recent decisions dealing with the general
provisions set out in chapter 1 of the Penal Code. In Morton v. State,' the
appellant contested the jurisdiction of the court in a case involving a false
statement on a license application in violation of the Texas Racing Act.
The appellant argued that the provisions of the Texas Racing Act were
found in article 179e of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes2 and not in the
Penal Code, and therefore, his conduct could not constitute a criminal
offense. The court rejected the argument, holding that "section 1.03 of
the Texas Penal Code provides that any conduct which is defined in a
statute as an offense constitutes an offense under the meaning of the pe-
nal code."'3
In Hall v. State,4 the appellant claimed the evidence was insufficient to
support a jury's finding of the use of a deadly weapon, after he pled guilty
to involuntary manslaughter. The court held that evidence that the ap-
pellant had consumed a substantial quantity of beer, driven his truck sev-
enty miles per hour in a forty mile per hour speed zone, run a stop sign
and collided with another vehicle, killing one of the occupants, consti-
tuted ample proof that he was acting in a reckless manner. 5 The court
also held that appellant's "truck, as used by him, became capable of caus-
ing death or serious bodily injury in the manner of its use," within the
1. 935 S.W.2d 904 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1996, no pet.).
2. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 179e, § 14.06 (Vernon Supp. 1997).
3. Morton, 935 S.W.2d at 906 (citing TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 1.03 (Vernon 1994)).
4. 935 S.W.2d 852 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1996, no pet.).
5. See id. at 854.
[Vol. 51
CRIMINAL LAW
terms of section 1.07(a) of the Texas Penal Code.6
In State v. Nailor,7 the State appealed the trial court's order granting a
motion to suppress in a driving while intoxicated (DWI) prosecution.
The evidence showed that a Holiday Inn security officer observed the
defendant motorist driving erratically in the motel's parking garage. On
one occasion, the defendant almost hit an employee. A police officer
called to the scene observed the defendant outside of his vehicle in the
parking lot, administered several sobriety tests, and arrested the defend-
ant for DWI. The trial court granted the motion to suppress, finding that
the Holiday Inn parking garage was not a public place.8 The Court of
Appeals, relying on the definition of a public place under section
1.07(a)(40) of the Texas Penal Code, held that the garage was a public
place as contemplated by the law. 9 The court stated that the fact that the
lot was "wide and open" as opposed to being enclosed was irrelevant. 10
The court also stated that a place can be public even though an entrance
fee is required.1'
III. MULTIPLE PROSECUTIONS UNDER CHAPTER 3
Chapter 3 of the Penal Code was modified in two significant ways.
First, the courts can now run sentences concurrently or consecutively in
sexual assault cases. Second, the defendant's right to severance was
restricted.
Section 3.03(b) of the Penal Code12 was amended to expand upon the
types of offenses for which a court can run sentences concurrently or con-
secutively. Originally, the subsection applied to convictions only under
6. Id. (citing TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(17)(B)(Vernon 1994)).
7. 949 S.W.2d 357 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1997, no pet. h.).
8. See id. at 358.
9. See id. at 359.
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. Section 3.03(b) provides as follows:
(b) If the accused is found guilty of more than one offense arising out of the
same criminal episode, the sentences may run concurrently or consecutively
if each sentence is for a conviction of:
(1) an offense:
(A) under Section 49.08; or
(B) for which a plea agreement was reached in a case in which
the accused was charged with more than one offense under Section 49.08; or
(2) an offense:
(A) under Section 21.11, 22.011, 22.021, 25.02, or 43.25 commit-
ted against a victim younger than 17 years of age at the time of the commis-
sion of the offense regardless of whether the accused is convicted of
violations of the same section more than once or is convicted of violations of
more than one section; or
(B) for which a plea agreement was reached in a case in which
the accused was charged with more than one offense listed in Paragraph (A)
committed against a victim younger than 17 years of age at the time of the
commission of the offense regardless of whether the accused is charged with
violations of the same section more than once or is charged with violations of
more than one section.
TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 3.03(b) (Vernon Supp. 1998).
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section 49.08 of the Penal Code. Under the amendment, convictions for
sexual assaults under sections 21.11 (Indecency With a Child),13 22.011
(Sexual Assault), 14 22.021 (Aggravated Sexual Assault), 15 25.02 (Prohib-
ited Sexual Conduct),1 6 and 43.25 (Sexual Performance by a Child), 17 or
13. Section 21.11, Indecency with a Child, provides as follows:
(a) A person commits an offense if, with a child younger than 17 years and
not his spouse, whether the child is of the same or opposite sex, he:
(1) engages in sexual contact with the child; or
(2) exposes his anus or any part of his genitals, knowing the child is
present, with intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person.
(b) It is an affirmative defense to prosecution under this section that the
actor:
(1) was not more than three years older than the victim and of the
opposite sex; and
(2) did not use duress, force, or a threat against the victim at the
time of the offense.
(c) An offense under Subsection (a)(1) is a felony of the second degree and
an offense under Subsection (a)(2) is a felony of the third degree.
Id. § 21.11 (Vernon 1994).
14. See infra notes 51-54.
15. See infra note 55 and accompanying text.
16. Section 25.02 provides as follows:
(a) An individual commits an offense if he engages in sexual intercourse or
deviate sexual intercourse with a person he knows to be, without regard to
legitimacy:
(1) his ancestor or descendant by blood or adoption;
(2) his stepchild or stepparent, while the marriage creating that rela-
tionship exists;
(3) his parent's brother or sister of the whole or half blood;
(4) his brother or sister of the whole or half blood or by adoption; or
(5) the children of his brother or sister of the whole or half blood or
by adoption.
(b) For purposes of this section:
(1) "Deviate sexual intercourse" means any contact between the
genitals of one person and the mouth or anus of another person with intent
to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person.
(2) "Sexual intercourse" means any penetration of the female sex
organ by the male sex organ.
(c) An offense under this section is a felony of the third degree.
TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 25.02 (Vernon 1994).
17. Section 43.25 provides, in part, as follows:
(a) In this section:
(1) "Sexual performance" means any performance or part thereof
that includes sexual conduct by a child younger than 18 years of age.
(2) "Sexual conduct" means actual or simulated sexual intercourse,
deviate sexual intercourse, sexual bestiality, masturbation, sado-masochistic
abuse, or lewd exhibition of the genitals.
(3) "Performance" means any play, motion picture, photograph,
dance, or other visual representation that can be exhibited before an audi-
ence of one or more persons.
(4) "Produce" with respect to a sexual performance includes any
conduct that directly contributes to the creation or manufacture of the sexual
performance.
(5) "Promote" means to procure, manufacture, issue, sell, give, pro-
vide, lend, mail, deliver, transfer, transmit, publish, distribute, circulate, dis-
seminate, present, exhibit, or advertise or to offer or agree to do any of the
above.
(6) "Simulated" means the explicit depiction of sexual conduct that
creates the appearance of actual sexual conduct and during which a person
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the same offenses for which a plea agreement was reached will now sub-
ject the defendant to either concurrent or consecutive sentences at the
discretion of the court.
Section 3.04, governing severance, has been amended to provide that a
defendant's right to severance under section 3.04 of the Penal Code does
not apply to a prosecution for offenses described under section 3.03(b)(2)
"unless the court determines that the defendant or the state would be
unfairly prejudiced by a joinder of offenses, in which event the judge may
order the offenses to be tried separately or may order other relief as jus-
tice requires."'18
Two recent decisions have discussed these "multiple prosecution"
provisions.
In Gaffney v. State,19 the defendant was tried simultaneously on four
indictments involving robbery and aggravated kidnapping on the first vic-
tim and aggravated robbery and aggravated kidnapping on the second
victim. The appellate court found the evidence factually insufficient as to
an aggravated kidnapping conviction.20 On motion for rehearing, the de-
fendant complained that the appellate court should have granted new tri-
als in all of the cases when the court reversed any one of the charges for
which he was simultaneously tried and convicted.21 The appellate court
held that if the defendant had wished to preclude the jury from hearing
the evidence in the other offenses, he had the right under section 3.04 of
the Penal Code to have those offenses severed and tried separately and
that when he failed to object to the consolidation of indictments, he con-
engaging in the conduct exhibits any uncovered portion of the breasts, geni-
tals, or buttocks.
(7) "Deviate sexual intercourse" has the meaning defined by Section
43.01.
(b) A person commits an offense if, knowing the character and content
thereof, he employs, authorizes, or induces a child younger than 18 years of
age to engage in sexual conduct or a sexual performance. A parent or legal
guardian or custodian of a child younger than 18 years of age commits an
offense if he consents to the participation by the child in a sexual
performance.
(c) An offense under Subsection (b) is a felony of the second degree.
(d) A person commits an offense if, knowing the character and content of
the material, he produces, directs, or promotes a performance that includes
sexual conduct by a child younger than 18 years of age.
(e) An offense under Subsection (d) is a felony of the third degree.
(f) It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under this section that:
(1) the defendant, in good faith, reasonably believed that the child
who engaged in the sexual conduct was 18 years of age or older;
(2) the defendant was the spouse of the child at the time of the
offense;
(3) the conduct was for a bona fide educational, medical, psychologi-
cal, psychiatric, judicial, law enforcement, or legislative purpose; or
(4) the defendant is not more than two years older than the child.
Id. § 43.25(a)-(f).
18. TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 3.04(c) (Vernon Supp. 1998).
19. 940 S.W.2d 682 (Tex. App.-Texarkana, 1996, pet. ref'd).




sented to a single trial.22
In State v. Weaver,23 the State appealed the trial court's severance of
twenty-four complainants from a theft indictment which alleged that the
defendant intended to deprive thirty-two complainants of their property
pursuant to a single scheme or continuing course of conduct, which in-
volved snail farming. The court reviewed the provisions of section 31.09
of the Penal Code relevant to aggregation in a theft case and ultimately
held that only one theft offense was alleged, and that Penal Code section
3.02 did not apply, and therefore the trial court's order severing the ma-
jority of the complainants from the case, which ultimately reduced the
charge to a state jail felony, was improper.24
IV. CHAPTER 9-JUSTIFICATION EXCLUDING CRIMINAL
RESPONSIBILITY
Prior section 9.01 of the Penal Code defined the terms "custody" and
"escape."'25 The amendments to section 9.01(1) and (2) eliminated these
definitions and adopted the definitions assigned by section 38.01 of the
Penal Code,26 thereby considerably expanding the meaning of both
terms.
In Rivera v. State,27 a case involving a prosecution for possession of a
deadly weapon in a penal institution under section 46.10 of the Penal
Code, the court rejected the State's argument that the defense of neces-
22. See id.
23. 945 S.W.2d 334 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, pet. granted).
24. See id. at 335-36. See also Crum v. State, 946 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. App.- Houston
[14th Dist.] 1997, pet. ref'd).
25. Prior section 9.01(1) and (2) provided as follows:
(1) "Custody" means:
(A) Under arrest by a peace officer; or
(B) under restraint by a public servant pursuant to an order of a court.
(2) "Escape" means unauthorized departure from custody or failure to re-
turn to custody following temporary leave for a specific purpose or limited
period, but does not include a violation of conditions of community supervi-
sion or parole, or following leave that is part of an intermittent sentence.
Act effective Jan. 1, 1974, 63rd Leg., R.S., ch. 399, § 1, 1973 Gen. Laws 883 (amended 1993)
(current version at TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 9.01 (Vernon Supp. 1998)).
26. Section 38.01 (definitions) provides as follows:
In this chapter:
(1) "Custody" means:
(A) under arrest by a peace officer or under restraint by a public
servant pursuant to an order of a court of this state or another state of the
United States; or
(B) under restraint by an agent or employee of a facility that is oper-
ated by or under contract with the United States and that confines persons
arrested for, charged with, or convicted of criminal offenses.
(2) "Escape" means unauthorized departure from custody or failure to re-
turn to custody following temporary leave for a specific purpose or limited
period or leave that is part of an intermittent sentence, but does not include a
violation of conditions of community supervision or parole other than condi-
tions that impose a period of confinement in a secure correctional facility.
TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 38.01(1)-(2) (Vernon Supp. 1998).
27. 948 S.W.2d 365, 370 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1997, no pet. h.).
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sity was not available to individuals charged under section 46.10. The
court noted that even the prison policy prohibited the correctional officer
in this case from intervening in the disturbance.28 The court concluded
that under circumstances in which an inmate is attacked by another in-
mate, "an inmate would naturally find it 'immediately necessary' to grab
any implement available to assist him in what is apparently the daily
prison ritual of survival of the fittest."'29 Thus, when properly raised by
the evidence, the defense of necessity is available to a defendant in a
prosecution under section 46.10.
V. PUNISHMENTS UNDER TITLE 3, CHAPTER 12
The Texas Legislature made two substantial amendments to the punish-
ment provisions in chapter 12. First, general changes were made to provi-
sions governing penalties for repeat felony offenders. Second, harsher
penalties are now available for crimes against protected groups.
Section 12.42, Penalties for Repeat and Habitual Felony Offenders, still
provides that if it is shown at a first-degree felony trial that the defendant
has previously been convicted of a felony, the punishment range will be
confinement for life, or for any term of not less than fifteen nor more
than ninety-nine years and an optional fine up to $10,000.30
In addition, as amended, section 12.42(c)(2) imposes a mandatory life
sentence if the defendant is convicted of one of a number of specified
offenses and the defendant has previously been convicted of an offense
under specified provisions of the Penal Code or similar criminal laws of
sister states.31 This section visits harsh penalties on sexual offenders and
28. See id. at 367.
29. Id. at 370.
30. See TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 12.42(c)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1998).
31. Section 12.42(c)(2) provides as follows:
(c)(2) A defendant shall be punished by imprisonment in the institutional
division for life if:
(A) the defendant is convicted of an offense:
(i) under Section 22.021 or 22.011, Penal Code;
(ii) under Section 20.04(a)(4), Penal Code, if the defendant
committed the offense with the intent to violate or abuse the victim sexually;
or
(iii) under Section 30.02, Penal Code, punishable under Subsec-
tion (d) of that section, if the defendant committed the offense with the in-
tent to commit a felony described by Subparagraph (i) or (ii) or a felony
under Section 21.11 or 22.011, Penal Code; and
(B) the defendant has been previously convicted of an offense:
(i) under Section 43.25 or 43.26, Penal Code;
(ii) under Section 21.11, 22.011, 22.021, or 25.02, Penal Code;
(iii) under Section 20.04(a)(4), Penal Code, if the defendant
committed the offense with the intent to violate or abuse the victim sexually;
(iv) under Section 30.02, Penal Code, punishable under Subsec-
tion (d) of that section, if the defendant committed the offense with the in-
tent to commit a felony described by Subparagraph (ii) or (iii); or
(v) under the laws of another state containing elements that are
substantially similar to the elements of an offense listed in Subparagraph (i),
(ii), (iii), or (iv).TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 12.42(c)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1998).
1998]
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child molesters. Most of these new provisions were transferred from sub-
section (d) of this same section.
Newly amended section 12.42(d) now comprises one paragraph, which
provides that "[if] it is shown on the trial of a felony offense other than a
state jail felony ... that the defendant has previously been convicted of
two felony offenses, and the second previous felony conviction [was] for
an offense that occurred subsequent to the first previous conviction hav-
ing become final," the punishment range is life, or any term of years be-
tween twenty-five and ninety-nine. 32
The Legislature also added new section 12.42(g). This section provides
that "a defendant has been previously convicted of an offense under Sub-
section (d)(2)(B) if the defendant was [found] guilty of the offense or
[pled guilty or no contest] in return for a grant of deferred adjudica-
tion."'33 The provision seeks to dispense with the niceties differentiating
between prison sentences, probated sentences and deferred adjudication.
Whether this subsection is valid or not,34 it certainly signals the tempera-
ment of the Legislature which favors stringent enhancement of
punishments.
Section 12.47 now provides that "if the judge or jury [depending upon
which is setting punishment], makes an affirmative finding [that the de-
fendant intentionally selected the victim primarily because of the defend-
ant's bias or prejudice against a group under article 42.014 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure,] in the punishment phase of the trial of an offense
other than a first degree felony or a Class A misdemeanor, the punish-
ment for the offense is increased to the punishment prescribed for the
next higher category of offense." 35 In the case of a Class A misdemeanor,
the minimum prison term is increased to 180 days.36
VI. CRIMINAL INSTRUMENTS AND INTERCEPTION OF
WIRE OR ORAL COMMUNICATION UNDER
CHAPTER 16
The Legislature changed laws governing offenses dealing with the in-
terception of wire or oral communication. Chapter 16 was amended both
to expand the proscribed conduct and to provide new affirmative de-
fenses for employees of communication carriers.
Section 16.03 has been amended to expand the proscribed conduct in-
volving interception of wire or oral communication. 37 Now a person vio-
lates the law if the person "knowingly installs or uses a pen register or
trap and trace device to record or decode electronic or other impulses for
32. Id. § 12.42(d).
33. Id. § 12.42(g).
34. This section appears to have referred to old subsection (d)(2)(B) without recogniz-
ing that the language was transferred to subsection (c)(2).
35. TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 12.47 (Vernon Supp. 1998). See also TEX. CODE CRIM.
PROC. ANN. art. 42.014 (Vernon Supp. 1998).
36. See id.
37. See TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 16.03(a) (Vernon Supp. 1998).
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the purpose of identifying telephone numbers dialed or otherwise trans-
mitted on a telephone line."'38
Previously, an exception to such a violation was a court order obtained
under article 18.21 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.39 The amend-
ment40 provides an affirmative defense to prosecution for officers, em-
ployees or agents of communications common carriers. The defense is
available for such actors who are protecting property of the carrier or are
in the course of cooperating with law enforcement.41 Similar protection
is available to agents of "lawful enterprises" when protection of property
is part of a service offering of the enterprise that does not involve gather-
ing of information for law enforcement (unless it is related to the theft of
communication or information services offered by the enterprise).4 2 The
thrust of the amendment is to place the burden of proof upon the actor,
not upon the prosecution.
The amendment to section 16.04 likewise makes it an affirmative de-
fense to prosecution that certain conduct was authorized by a provider,
user, or addressee or intended recipient of the wire or electronic commu-
nication.43 The amendment eliminates the exception and inserts an af-
firmative defense.44
38. Id.
39. Prior section 16.03(a) provided as follows:
(a) Except as authorized by a court order obtained under Article 18.21,
Code of Criminal Procedure, or in an emergency under the circumstances
described and permitted under that article, a person commits an offense if he
knowingly installs or utilizes a pen register or trap and trace device to record
telephone numbers dialed from or to a telephone instrument.
TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 16.03(a) (Vernon 1994).
40. Section 16.03(c) now provides as follows:
(c) It is an affirmative defense to prosecution under Subsection (a) that the
actor is:
(1) an officer, employee, or agent of a communications common car-
rier and the actor installs or uses a device or equipment to record a number
dialed from or to a telephone instrument in the normal course of business of
the carrier for purposes of:
(A) protecting property or services provided by the carrier; or
(B) assisting another who the actor reasonably believes to be a
peace officer authorized to install or use a pen register or trap and trace
device under Article 18.21, Code of Criminal Procedure;
(2) an officer, employee, or agent of a lawful enterprise and the ac-
tor installs or uses a device or equipment while engaged in an activity that:
(A) is a necessary incident to the rendition of service or to the
protection of property of or services provided by the enterprise; and
(B) is not made for the purpose of gathering information for a
law enforcement agency or private investigative agency, other than informa-
tion related to the theft of communication or information services provided
by the enterprise; or
(3) a person authorized to install or use a pen register or trap and
trace device under Article 18.21, Code of Criminal Procedure.
TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 16.03(c) (Vernon Supp. 1998).
41. See id. § 16.03(c)(1).
42. See id. § 16.03(c)(2).




The amendment to section 16.0545 makes it a criminal offense for elec-
tronic communications service providers to knowingly46 divulge the con-
tents of the communication to someone other than the intended recipient.
Once again, the amendment provides an affirmative defense for those
authorized by federal or state law, or "to a person employed, authorized,
or whose facilities are used to forward the communication," or "to a law
enforcement agency if the contents reasonably appear to involve the com-
mission of a crime. ' 47 A violation of section 16.05 that "involves a scram-
bled or encrypted radio communication is a state jail felony"48 unless the
crime is "committed for a tortious or illegal purpose or to gain a benefit,"
in which event the offense is a misdemeanor. 49
VII. KIDNAPPING AND UNLAWFUL RESTRAINT UNDER
CHAPTER 20
The heading of chapter 20 has been changed from "Kidnapping and
False Imprisonment" to "Kidnapping and Unlawful Restraint."
Section 20.02, which proscribes unlawful restraint, changes the offense
from an automatic felony of the third degree to a Class B Misdemeanor
"unless the person restrained was a child younger than 14 years of age, in
which event the crime is a Class A misdemeanor; or [unless] the actor
recklessly exposed the victim to a substantial risk of serious bodily injury,
in which event the crime is a [third-degree felony]. '50
VIII. ASSAULTIVE OFFENSES UNDER CHAPTER 22
The modifications to section 22.01 were in the nature of housekeeping
efforts to clean up the organizational context rather than to change the
substance.
The amendment to section 22.011 added a provision that criminalizes
conduct when a person intentionally or knowingly "causes the mouth of a
child to contact the anus or sexual organ of another person."'51
45. See id. § 16.05(b).
46. This provision is limited to the culpable mental state of "knowingly" alone.
47. TEx. PEN. CODE ANN. § 16.05(c) (Vernon Supp. 1998).
48. Id. § 16.05(d).
49. Section 16.05(e) provides as follows:
(e) If committed for a tortious or illegal purpose or to gain a benefit, an
offense under Subsection (b) that involves a radio communication that is not
scrambled or encrypted:
(1) is a Class A misdemeanor if the communication is not a public
land mobile radio service communication or a paging service communication;
or
(2) is a Class C misdemeanor if the communication is a public land
mobile radio service communication or a paging service communication.
Id. § 16.05(e).
50. Id. § 20.02(c).
51. Section 22.011(a) provides as follows:
(a) A person commits an offense if the person:
(1) intentionally or knowingly:
[Vol. 51
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The amendment to section 22.011(b) 52 expanded the instances in which
a sexual assault under subsection (a)(1) is considered "without the con-
sent of the other person" to include not only an actor who is a mental
health services provider but also a health care services provider.53
Section 22.011(c)(3) was added to define the meaning of "health care
services provider" to include a physician, a chiropractor, a licensed voca-
tional nurse, a physical therapist, a physician assistant, and a registered
(A) causes the penetration of the anus or female sexual organ
of another person by any means, without that person's consent;
(B) causes the penetration of the mouth of another person by
the sexual organ of the actor without that person's consent; or
(C) causes the sexual organ of another person, without that per-
son's consent, to contact or penetrate the mouth, anus, or sexual organ of
another person, including the actor; or
(2) intentionally or knowingly:
(A) causes the penetration of the anus or female sexual organ
of a child by any means;
(B) causes the penetration of the mouth of a child by the sexual
organ of the actor;
(C) causes the sexual organ of a child to contact or penetrate
the mouth, anus, or sexual organ of another person, including the actor;
(D) causes the anus of a child to contact the mouth, anus, or
sexual organ of another person, including the actor; or
(E) causes the mouth of a child to contact the anus or sexual or-
gan of another person, including the actor.
Id. § 22.011(a) (emphasis added).
52. Section 22.011(b) provides as follows:
(b) A sexual assault under Subsection (a)(1)is without the consent of the
other person if:
(1) the actor compels the other person to submit or participate by
the use of physical force or violence;
(2) the actor compels the other person to submit or participate by
threatening to use force or violence against the other person, and the other
person believes that the actor has the present ability to execute the threat;
(3) the other person has not consented and the actor knows the
other person is unconscious or physically unable to resist;
(4) the actor knows that as a result of mental disease or defect the
other person is at the time of the sexual assault incapable either of appraising
the nature of the act or of resisting it;
(5) the other person has not consented and the actor knows the
other person is unaware that the sexual assault is occurring;
(6) the actor has intentionally impaired the other person's power to
appraise or control the other person's conduct by administering any sub-
stance without the other person's knowledge;
(7) the actor compels the other person to submit or participate by
threatening to use force or violence against any person, and the other person
believes that the actor has the ability to execute the threat;
(8) the actor is a public servant who coerces the other person to sub-
mit or participate;
(9) the actor is a mental health services provider or a health care serv-
ices provider who causes the other person, who is a patient or former patient of
the actor, to submit or participate by exploiting the other person's emotional
dependency on the actor; or
(10) the actor is a clergyman who causes the other person to submit
or participate by exploiting the other person's emotional dependency on the
clergyman in the clergyman's professional character as spiritual adviser.
Id. § 22.011(b) (emphasis added).
53. See id. § 22.011(b)(9).
1998]
SMU LAW REVIEW
nurse or an advanced practice nurse designated under various licensing
provisions. 54
Section 22.021 was amended to add the provision that a person com-
mits an offense if the person intentionally or knowingly "causes the
mouth of a child to contact the anus or sexual organ of another person,
including the actor. ' 55 Section 22.041 added as a defense subsection
(g), 56 which provides that
[it is now a] defense to prosecution under subsection (c) [which pros-
cribes an act or omission which places a child younger than 15 years
in imminent danger of death, bodily injury or physical or mental im-
pairment] that the act or omission enables the child to practice for or
participate in an organized athletic event and that appropriate safety
54. Section 22.011(c)(3) provides as follows:
(3) "Health care services provider" means:
(A) a physician licensed under the Medical Practice Act (Article
4495b, Vernon's Texas Civil Statutes);
(B) a chiropractor licensed under Chapter 94, Acts of the 51st Legis-
lature, Regular Session, 1949 (Article 4512b, Vernon's Texas Civil Statutes);
(C) a licensed vocational nurse licensed under Chapter 118, Acts of
the 52nd Legislature, 1951 (Article 4528c, Vernon's Texas Civil Statutes);
(D) a physical therapist licensed under Chapter 836, Acts of the
62nd Legislature, Regular Session, 1971 (Article 4512e, Vernon's Texas Civil
Statutes);
(E) a physician assistant licensed under the Physician Assistant Li-
censing Act (Article 4495b-1, Vernon's Texas Civil Statutes); or(F) a registered nurse or an advanced practice nurse licensed under
Chapter 7, Title 71, Revised Statutes.
Id. § 22.011(c)(3).
55. Id. § 22.021.
56. Section 22.041 provides as follows:
(a) In this section, "abandon" means to leave a child in any place without
providing reasonable and necessary care for the child, under circumstances
under which no reasonable, similarly situated adult would leave a child of
that age and ability.
(b) A person commits an offense if, having custody, care, or control of a
child younger than 15 years, he intentionally abandons the child in any place
under circumstances that expose the child to an unreasonable risk of harm.(c) A person commits an offense if he intentionally, knowingly, recklessly,
or with criminal negligence, by act or omission, engages in conduct that
places a child younger than 15 years in imminent danger of death, bodily
injury, or physical or mental impairment.
(d) Except as provided by Subsection (e), an offense under Subsection (b)
is:
(1) a state jail felony if the actor abandoned the child with intent to
return for the child; or
(2) a felony of the third degree if the actor abandoned the child
without intent to return for the child.(e) An offense under Subsection (b) is a felony of the second degree if the
actor abandons the child under circumstances that a reasonable person
would believe would place the child in imminent danger of death, bodily in-
jury, or physical or mental impairment.
(f) An offense under Subsection (c) is a state jail felony.
(g) It is a defense to prosecution under Subsection (c) that the act or omis-
sion enables the child to practice for or participate in an organized athletic
event and that appropriate safety equipment and procedures are employed in
the event.
TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 22.041 (Vernon Supp. 1998) (emphasis added).
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equipment and procedures are employed in the event.57
Three cases recently discussed chapter 22 offenses in more detail.
In Mateo v. State,58 the court reviewed whether the State needs to
prove that the defendant knew the age of a child in a trial for aggravated
assault of a child. In Mateo, the appellant pled guilty to an indictment
alleging aggravated sexual assault of a child. Pursuant to a plea bargain,
punishment was set at five years confinement. The appellant preserved
his right to appeal the court's order overruling his motion to quash the
indictment.59
The indictment alleged that the appellant "intentionally and knowingly
cause[d] his sex organ to contact and penetrate the female sex organ of
[the complainant] and the said [complainant] was then and there a child
younger than 14 years of age and not the spouse of the said [appel-
lant]." 60 The appellant complained that the indictment did not allege that
the appellant knew the complainant was a child. Appellant conceded it
was not necessary to allege or prove that he knew the child was younger
than 14.61
The Penal Code provides that a person commits an aggravated sexual
assault if he intentionally or knowingly "causes the penetration of the...
female sexual organ of a child by any means" or "causes the sexual organ
of a child to contact [the] . . . sexual organ of another person, including
the actor," and if "the victim is younger than 14 years of age."'62
The court initially observed that the Legislature rejected a proposed
mistake of fact defense to prosecutions based on sexual activity with chil-
dren when it passed the Penal Code in 1973.63 The court also recognized
that in 1983 the Legislature determined that offenses such as rape, aggra-
vated rape, rape of a child, sexual abuse, aggravated sexual abuse and
sexual abuse of a child were assaultive, not sexual, in nature and thus
their classification as sexual offenses only confused the situation.64 The
statutes were, therefore, repealed and the legislature created the offenses
of sexual assault and aggravated sexual assault.65 Based upon the legisla-
tive history of these Penal Code sections and the decisions construing
them, the court held that the State need not prove the defendant's knowl-
edge of the complainant's age in a prosecution involving an adult's sexual
conduct with a child.66
In Herbst v. State,67 the appellant challenged the felony conviction for
57. Id. § 22.041(g).
58. 935 S.W.2d 512 (Tex. App.-Austin 1996, no pet.).
59. See id. at 513 n.2.
60. Id.
61. See id.
62. TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 22.021(a)(1)(B)(i), (a)(1)(B)(iii), (a)(2)(B) (Vernon
Supp. 1998).
63. See Mateo, 935 S.W.2d at 513.
64. See id. at 514.
65. See id.
66. See id.
67. 941 S.W.2d 371, 372 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1997, no pet.).
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endangering a child under Penal Code section 22.041(b), arguing that the
evidence was legally insufficient to prove the appellant abandoned the
child under circumstances that exposed the child to an unreasonable risk
of harm. The facts showed that the appellant placed the three week old
baby on the side of a well-traveled, but very dark roadway at approxi-
mately 10:00 p.m. The baby was strapped into an infant car seat and
clothed in a dress and diaper. When the baby was subsequently taken to
the hospital, the child had many insect bites covering exposed areas of the
body. The court found the evidence sufficient, emphasizing that the ex-
press language of section 22.041 requires the appellate court to review the
circumstances through the eyes of a "reasonable, similarly situated adult"
and not based upon "any subjective intent or knowledge on the part of
appellant. '68
In Cook v. State,69 the court reviewed the legal sufficiency of the evi-
dence to prove terroristic threats under section 22.01 of the Penal Code.
The appellant argued that the telephone threats would not support a find-
ing that the appellant intended to place anyone in fear of "imminent seri-
ous bodily injury."'70 The appellant argued that because his messages
were conditional threats of future harm and were left on the victim's
voice mail when the victim was out of town, they could not be considered
imminent.
The court, in analyzing the term "imminent serious bodily injury," em-
phasized that the conduct becomes criminal when the defendant makes a
threat of violence with the intent to place the victim in fear of imminent
serious bodily injury.71 It is not necessary that the victim or anyone else
be actually placed in fear of imminent serious bodily injury. It is suffi-
cient if the defendant, by his threat, "sought as a desired reaction, to
place a person in fear of imminent serious bodily injury."'72 The court
found that the evidence supported the judgment of conviction.73
IX. OFFENSES AGAINST THE FAMILY UNDER CHAPTER 25
Several modifications were made to chapter 25, which governs offenses
against family.
Section 25.07, by modification, eliminated subsection (a)(4) which pro-
scribed conduct directed specifically toward a person who was a member
of the family or household including following the person that was rea-
sonably likely to harass or annoy.74 The penalty provisions of section
68. Id. at 373.
69. 940 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1997, pet. ref'd).
70. Id. at 347.
71. See id.
72. Id.
73. See id. at 348.
74. Former § 25.07(a)(4) made it an offense to engage "in conduct directed specifically
toward a person who is a member of the family or household, including following the
person, that is reasonably likely to harass, annoy, alarm, abuse, torment, or embarrass that
person." Act effective Sept. 1, 1983, 68th Leg. R.S., ch. 631, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 4049,
(amended 1997) (current version at TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 25.07 (Vernon Supp. 1998).
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25.07 were also altered so that an offense under this section is a Class A
misdemeanor unless it is shown at trial that the defendant was convicted
two or more times or had violated the protective order by committing
assault or stalking, in which event the offense is a third-degree felony, not
a state jail felony.75
Section 25.09 of the Penal Code is an entirely new criminal offense.
This section provides that "[a] person commits an offense if the person
advertises in the public media that the person will place a child for adop-
tion or will provide or obtain a child for adoption."'76 The provision is not
applicable to a licensed child-placing agency so identified in the advertise-
ment.77 This is a Class A misdemeanor "unless the person has been con-
victed previously under this section, in which event the offense is a felony
of the third degree."'78
X. ARSON, CRIMINAL MISCHIEF AND OTHER PROPERTY
DAMAGE OR DESTRUCTION UNDER CHAPTER 28
Section 28.02 of the Penal Code governing arson was amended as to
punishment only, adding a provision making the offense a first-degree
felony if it is shown that "the actor committed the offense knowing that
the property intended to be damaged or destroyed was a place of
worship.",79
Another section that has been amended as to punishment is section
28.03(b).8 0 It provides that it is "a Class C misdemeanor if . . . the
amount of the pecuniary loss is less than $50" (changed from $20).81 It is
"a Class B misdemeanor if the amount of the pecuniary loss is $50 or
more but less than $500."82 It is "a state jail felony if the amount of
pecuniary loss is . . . $1,500 or more but less than $20,000 or less than
$1,500 if the property damaged or destroyed is a habitation and if the
damage or destruction is caused by a firearm or explosive weapon. '8 3
New subsection (g) provides that the terms "firearm" and "explosive
weapon" have the meanings assigned by section 46.01 of the Penal
Code. 84
75. Section 25.07(g) provides as follows:
(g) An offense under this section is a Class A misdemeanor unless it is
shown on the trial of the offense that the defendant has previously been con-
victed under this section two or more times or has violated the protective
order by committing an assault or the offense of stalking, in which event the
offense is a third degree felony.
TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 25.07 (Vernon Supp. 1998).
76. Id. § 25.09(a).
77. See id. § 25.09(b).
78. Id. § 25.09(c).
79. Id. § 28.02(d)(2).
80. See id. § 28.03(b)(4).
81. Id. § 28.03(b)(1)(A).
82. Id. § 28.03(b)(2).
83. Id. § 28.03(4)(A)-(B).
84. See id. § 28.03(g).
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Newly created section 28.08 defines the offense of graffiti.85 This sec-
tion criminalizes conduct in which a person intentionally or knowingly
makes markings on the tangible property of the owner with aerosol paint
or an indelible marker and without the owner's consent.86 The punish-
ment range is from a Class B misdemeanor to a first-degree felony de-
pending upon the amount of loss. 87 The section addresses aggregation of
value "pursuant to one scheme or continuing course of conduct. '88 The
offense is an automatic state jail felony if the marking is made on one of
several different types of places including a place of worship or human
burial. 89
XI. ROBBERY UNDER CHAPTER 29
In Hernandez v. State,90 the court reviewed the sufficiency of the evi-
dence to support the conviction for aggravated robbery by examining the
distinctions between serious bodily injury and bodily injury. A person
commits aggravated robbery if he causes serious bodily injury to another
in the course of a robbery. 91 The appellant was charged with stabbing the
victim in the abdomen area with a knife.
The court first reviewed the applicable definitions. Serious bodily in-
jury means an "injury that creates a substantial risk of death or that
85. See id. § 28.08(a).
86. See id.
87. Section 28.08(b) provides as follows:
(b) Except as provided by Subsection (d), an offense under this section is:
(1) a Class B misdemeanor if the amount of pecuniary loss is less
than $500;
(2) a Class A misdemeanor if the amount of pecuniary loss is $500 or
more but less than $1,500;
(3) a state jail felony if the amount of pecuniary loss is $1,500 or
more but less than $20,000;
(4) a felony of the third degree if the amount of pecuniary loss is
$20,000 or more but less than $100,000;
(5) a felony of the second degree if the amount of pecuniary loss is
$100,000 or more but less than $200,000; or
(6) a felony of the first degree if the amount of pecuniary loss is
$200,000 or more.
Id. § 28.08(b).
88. Id. § 28.08(c). The full subsection provides as follows:
When more than one item of tangible property, belonging to one or more
owners, is marked in violation of this section pursuant to one scheme or con-
tinuing course of conduct, the conduct may be considered as one offense, and
the amounts of pecuniary loss to property resulting from the marking of the
property may be aggregated in determining the grade of the offense.
Id.
89. See id. 28.08(d). The full subsection provides as follows:
An offense under this section is a state jail felony if the marking is made on a
place of worship or human burial, a public monument, or a community
center that provides medical, social, or educational programs and the amount
of the pecuniary loss to real property or to tangible personal property is less
than $20,000.
Id.
90. 946 S.W.2d 108 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1997, no pet.).
91. See TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 29.03(a)(1) (Vernon 1994).
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causes death, serious permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or im-
pairment of the function of any bodily member or organ."' 92 Bodily in-
jury means "physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical
condition. '' 93 Whether an injury qualifies as serious bodily injury must be
examined on a case by case basis.94 A medical expert testified that the
wound potentially could have been life threatening if other co-existing
conditions were present, but none were in this case. The court concluded
that bodily injury cannot be elevated to serious bodily injury "by postu-
lating potential complications which are not in evidence. ' 95 On the basis
of the testimony of the expert and the victim that the victim was stabbed,
underwent surgery, and was ordered by his doctor to stay home from
work for six weeks, the court found that the record contained no testi-
mony that the victim's injury created a substantial risk of death. 96
Further, the court rejected the State's argument that the victim's one-
inch laceration to the abdomen constituted evidence of a serious perma-
nent disfigurement. 97 The court emphasized that there must be evidence
of "some significant cosmetic deformity caused by the injury," and the
record was void of any such evidence. 98 In addition, the court found no
evidence of protracted impairment of a member or organ, or any evi-
dence that the victim was restricted in any particular physical activity. 99
The period of recuperation was found insufficient to elevate bodily injury
to serious bodily injury. 100
XII. BURGLARY AND CRIMINAL TRESPASS UNDER
CHAPTER 30
Section 30.05, of the Penal Code which governs the offense of criminal
trespass, was amended to add another type of notice in the form of "the
placement of identifying purple paint marks on trees or posts on the
property" provided that the marks assume a specific form at particular
placements.' 0l
Newly enacted section 30.06 specifically deals with trespass by a holder
92. Id. § 1.07(a)(46).
93. Id. § 1.07(a)(8).
94. See Hernandez, 946 S.W.2d at 111.
95. Id. at 112.
96. See id. at 112-13.




101. TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 30.05(b)(2)(D) (Vernon Supp. 1998). The full subsection
provides as follows:
(2) "Notice" means:
(A) oral or written communication by the owner or someone with
apparent authority to act for the owner;
(B) fencing or other enclosure obviously designed to exclude intrud-
ers or to contain livestock;
(C) a sign or signs posted on the property or at the entrance to the
building, reasonably likely to come to the attention of intruders, indicating
that entry is forbidden;
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of a license to carry a concealed handgun. 102 "A license holder commits
an offense if [he] carries a handgun ... on property of another without
effective consent" and receives notice that entry with a weapon was for-
bidden and fails to depart.10 3 A breach of this section constitutes a Class
A misdemeanor. 1°4
XIII. THEFT UNDER CHAPTER 31
Section 31.03(f) of the Penal Code was amended to enhance the pun-
ishment in an additional circumstance. Theft now includes any instance
when "the actor was in a contractual relationship with government at the
time of the offense and the property appropriated came into the actor's
(D) the placement of identifying purple paint marks on trees or posts
on the property, provided that the marks are
(i) vertical lines of not less than eight inches in length and not less
than one inch in width;
(ii) placed so that the bottom of the mark is not less than three
feet from the ground or more than five feet from the ground; or
(iii) placed at locations that are readily visible to any person ap-
proaching the property and no more than;
(a) 100 feet apart on forest land; or
(b) 1,000 feet apart on land other than forest land; or
(E) the visible presence on the property of a crop grown for human
consumption that is under cultivation, in the process of being harvested, or
marketable if harvested at the time of entry.
Id. § 30.05(b)(2) (emphasis added).
102. Section 30.06 provides as follows:
(a) A license holder commits an offense if the license holder:
(1) carries a handgun under the authority of Article 4413(29ee), Re-
vised Statutes, on property of another without effective consent; and
(2) received notice that:
(A) entry on the property by a license holder with a concealed
handgun was forbidden; or
(B) remaining on the property with a concealed handgun was
forbidden and failed to depart.
(b) For purposes of this section, a person receives notice if the owner of the
property or someone with apparent authority to act for the owner provides
notice to the person by oral or written communication.
(c) in this section:
(1) "Entry" has the meaning assigned by Section 30.05(b).
(2) "License holder" has the meaning assigned by Section 46.035(f).
(3) "Written communication" means:
(A) a card or other document on which is written language
identical to the following: "Pursuant to Section 30.06, Penal Code (trespass
by a holder of license to carry a concealed handgun), a person licensed under
Article 4413(29ee), Revised Statutes (concealed handgun law), may not
enter this property with a concealed handgun;" or
(B) a sign posted on the property that:
(i) includes the language described by Paragraph (A) in
both English and Spanish;
(ii) appears in contrasting colors with block letters at least
one inch in height; and
(iii) is displayed in a conspicuous manner clearly visible to
the public.
Id. § 30.06.
103. Id. § 30.06(a).
104. See id. § 30.06(d).
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custody, possession, or control by virtue of the contractual
relationship.' 10 5
Section 31.03(c) was discussed at length in Ballard v. State.106 In this
theft case, the State offered testimony concerning four similar theft trans-
actions to prove the defendant's criminal intent. The charged offense oc-
curred in 1993, and three of the extraneous offenses were committed
within one year of that date. The fourth offense occurred five years pre-
viously. The defendant argued on appeal that section 31.03(c) of the Pe-
nal Code (which required showing that the extraneous transactions be
"recent") rather than Texas Criminal Evidence Rule 404(b) 10 7 governed
the admissibility of the fourth extraneous offense. The appellate court
concluded that the specific statute (section 31.03(c)) controlled over the
general rule in theft cases, citing section 311.026 of the Texas Govern-
ment Code.10 8 Ultimately however, the court concluded the error was
harmless.' 0 9
XIV. FRAUD UNDER CHAPTER 32
Newly enacted section 32.23 criminalizes conduct in which a person
intentionally manufactures or advertises a counterfeit mark or an
item or service that "bears or is identified by a counterfeit mark [or]
the person knows or should have known bears or is identified by
a counterfeit mark."" 0  This section contains an aggregation provi-
105. Id. § 31.03(f).
106. See Ballard v. State, 945 S.W.2d 902 (Tex. App.-Beaumont, 1997, no pet. h.).
107. See TEX. R. CRiM. EVID. 404(b).
108. See TEX. Gov'T CODE Am. § 311.026 (Vernon 1988).
109. See Ballard, 945 S.W.2d at 905.
110. Section 32.23(a)-(c) provides as follows:
(a) In this section:
(1) "Counterfeit mark" means a mark that is identical to or substan-
tially indistinguishable from a protected mark the use or production of which
is not authorized by the owner of the protected mark.
(2) "Identification mark" means a data plate, serial number, or part
identification number.
(3) "Protected mark" means a trademark or service mark or an
identification mark that is:
(A) registered with the secretary of state;
(B) registered on the principal register of the United States Pat-
ent and Trademark Office;
(C) registered under the laws of another state; or
(D) protected by Section 16.30, Business & Commerce Code, or
by 36 U.S.C. Section 371 et seq.
(4) "Retail value" means the actor's regular selling price for a coun-
terfeit mark or an item or service that bears or is identified by a counterfeit
mark, except that if an item bearing a counterfeit mark is a component of a
finished product, the retail value means the actor's regular selling price of the
finished product on or in which the component is used, distributed, or sold.
(5) "Service mark" has the meaning assigned by Section 16.01, Busi-
ness & Commerce Code.
(6) "Trademark" has the meaning assigned by Section 16.01, Busi-
ness & Commerce Code.
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sion 1 11 and the punishment range 12 varies from a Class C misdemeanor
to a first-degree felony depending upon the retail value of the item or
service.
Section 32.41(f) was amended to provide that if "the check or similar
sight order [in question] was for a child support payment ... under a
court order, the offense is a Class B misdemeanor."" 13
The offense of securing the execution of document by deception was
expanded. 14 The offense now includes a person who, with intent to de-
fraud or harm another by deception, "causes or induces a public servant
(b) A person commits an offense if the person intentionally manufactures,
displays, advertises, distributes, offers for sale, sells, or possesses with intent
to sell or distribute a counterfeit mark or an item or service that:
(1) bears or is identified by a counterfeit mark; or
(2) the person knows or should have known bears or is identified by
a counterfeit mark.
(c) A state or federal certificate of registration of intellectual property is
prima facie evidence of the facts stated in the certificate.
TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 32.23(a)-(c) (Vernon Supp. 1998).
111. Section 32.23(d) provides as follows:
(d) For the purposes of Subsection (e), when items or services are the sub-
ject of counterfeiting in violation of this section pursuant to one scheme or
continuing course of conduct, the conduct may be considered as one offense
and the retail value of the items or services aggregated in determining the
grade of offense.
Id. § 32.23(d).
112. Section 32.23(e) provides as follows:
(e) An offense under this section is a:
(1) Class C misdemeanor if the retail value of the item or service is
less than $20;
(2) Class B misdemeanor if the retail value of the item or service is
$20 or more but less than $500;
(3) Class A misdemeanor if the retail value of the item or service is
$500 or more but less than $1,500;
(4) state jail felony if the retail value of the item or service is $1,500
or more but less than $20,000;
(5) felony of the third degree if the retail value of the item or service
is $20,000 or more but less than $100,000;
(6) felony of the second degree if the retail value of the item or ser-
vice is $100,000 or more but less than $200,000; or
(7) felony of the first degree if the retail value of the item or service
is $200,000 or more.
Id. § 32.23(e).
113. Id. § 32.41(f).
114. Section 32.46(a) provides as follows:
A person commits an offense if, with intent to defraud or harm any person,
he, by deception:
(1) causes another to sign or execute any document affecting prop-
erty or service or the pecuniary interest of any person; or
(2) causes or induces a public servant to file or record any purported
judgment or other document purporting to memorialize or evidence an act, an
order, a directive, or process of.
(A) a purported court that is not expressly created or established
under the constitution or the laws of this state or of the United States;
(B) a purported judicial entity that is not expressly created or es-
tablished under the constitution or laws of this state or of the United States; or
(C) a purported judicial officer of a purported court or pur-
ported judicial entity described by Paragraph (A) or (B).
TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 32.46(a) (Vernon Supp. 1998) (emphasis added).
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to file or record any purported judgment or other document purporting
to memorialize or evidence an act, an order, a directive, or process of" a
purported court, judicial entity or judicial officer of a purported court or
purported judicial entity "not expressly created or established under the
constitution or the laws of this state or of the United States." 115 A viola-
tion of section 32.46(a)(2) is a state jail felony.116
New legislation also created the offense of simulating legal process.
The Penal Code provides that a person commits an offense
if the person recklessly causes to be delivered to another any docu-
ment that simulates a summons, complaint, judgment, or other court
process with the intent to:
(1) induce payment of a claim from another person; or
(2) cause another to:
(A) submit to the putative authority of the document; or
(B) take any action or refrain from taking any action in re-
sponse to the document, in compliance with the docu-
ment, or on the basis of the document. 117
This offense is a Class A misdemeanor unless it is shown that the defend-
ant has previously been convicted of a violation of this section, in which
event it is a state jail felony.118
Refusal to execute release of a fraudulent lien or claim is now an of-
fense under newly enacted section 32.49.119 It is an offense if a person,
with intent to defraud or harm another, "holds a purported lien or claim
asserted against real or personal property.., that is fraudulent" and after
receiving specifically prescribed notice "requesting the execution of a re-
lease of the fraudulent lien or claim, refuses to execute the release.' '120
This offense is a Class A misdemeanor. 121
Newly enacted section 32.49122 (Deceptive Preparation and Marketing
of Academic Product) proscribes conduct in which a person, "with intent
to make a profit, . . . prepares, sells, offers or advertises for sale, or deliv-
ers to another.., an academic product when the person knows or should
.. . have known, that [the recipient] intends [to utilize] the academic
product to satisfy an academic requirement."'1 23 The statute provides cer-
tain defenses including conduct taken by an employee of an institution of
higher learning and conduct including tutorial and editing assistance.124
115. Id. § 32.46(a).
116. See id. § 32.46(c).
117. Id. § 32.48(a).
118. See id. § 32.48(e)-(f).
119. See id. § 32.49(a)-(b).
120. Id.
121. See id. § 32.49(c).
122. The Legislature mistakenly numbered two Penal Code provisions with the same
section 32.49.
123. TEx. PEN. CODE ANN. § 32.49(b) (Vernon Supp. 1998).
124. See id. Subsections (d), (e), and (f) provide as follows:
(d) It is a defense to prosecution under this section that the actor's conduct
consisted solely of action taken as an employee of an institution of higher
1998]
SMU LAW REVIEW
"An offense under this section is a Class C misdemeanor." 125
XV. COMPUTER CRIMES UNDER CHAPTER 33
Section 33.01 of the Penal Code expands upon the definition of terms
used in the chapter on computer crimes, adding a definition for "aggre-
gate amount. '126
The Legislature simplified the offense of breach of computer security
by retaining only subsection (a) of section 33.02, and eliminating prior
subsection (b).1 2 7 The revision substantially increases the potential pen-
alties well beyond the previous maximum of a third-degree felony, to a
first-degree felony.128
education in providing instruction, counseling, or tutoring in research or writ-
ing to students of the institution.
(e) It is a defense to prosecution under this section that the actor's conduct
consisted solely of offering or providing tutorial or editing assistance to an-
other person in connection with the other person's preparation of an aca-
demic product to satisfy the other person's academic requirement, and the
actor does not offer or provide substantial preparation, writing, or research
in the production of the academic product.
(f) It is a defense to prosecution under this section that the actor's conduct
consisted solely of typing, transcribing, or reproducing a manuscript for a fee,
or of offering to do so.
Id. § 32.49.
125. Id. § 32.49(g).
126. Section 33.01(2) provides:
(2) "Aggregate amount" means the amount of:
(A) any direct or indirect loss incurred by a victim, including the
value of money, property, or service stolen or rendered unrecoverable by the
offense; or
(B) any expenditure required by the victim to verify that a com-
puter, computer network, computer program, or computer system was not
altered, acquired, damaged, deleted, or disrupted by the offense.
TEX. PEN. CODE ArN. § 33.01 (Vernon Supp. 1998).
127. See id. § 33.02(a)(2). ("A person commits an offense if the person knowingly ac-
cesses a computer, computer network, or computer system without the effective consent of
the owner."). Id.
128. Section 33.02(b) and (d) provide as follows:
(b) An offense under this section is a Class B misdemeanor unless in com-
mitting the offense the actor knowingly obtains a benefit, defrauds or harms
another, or alters, damages, or deletes property, in which event the offense is:
(1) a Class A misdemeanor if the aggregate amount involved is less
than $1,500;
(2) a state jail felony if:
(A) the aggregate amount involved is $1,500 or more but less
than $20,000; or
(B) the aggregate amount involved is less than $1,500 and the
defendant has been previously convicted two or more times of an offense
under this chapter;
(3) a felony of the third degree if the aggregate amount involved is
$20,000 or more but less than $100,000;
(4) a felony of the second degree if the aggregate amount involved is
$100,000 or more but less than $200,000; or




XVI. TELECOMMUNICATIONS CRIMES UNDER
CHAPTER 33(A)
New legislation creates detailed criminal offenses defined as unauthor-
ized use of telecommunications service, manufacture, possession or deliv-
ery of unlawful telecommunications device, theft of telecommunications
service and publication of telecommunications access device, under sec-
tions 33(A).02 to 33(A).05 of the Penal Code. 129 The punishment ranges
from misdemeanors to first-degree felonies. 130 A special provision autho-
rizes the attorney general, upon appropriate request by a prosecuting at-
torney, to assist in the investigation or prosecution of any such offense.13'
XVII. BRIBERY AND CORRUPT INFLUENCE UNDER
CHAPTER 36
Section 36.05(a)(5) of the Penal Code was modified to include criminal
conduct directed at a "witness or prospective witness in an official pro-
ceeding ... to abstain from, discontinue or delay the prosecution of an-
other," not simply another "witness."' 132
XVIII. PERJURY AND OTHER FALSIFICATION UNDER
CHAPTER 37
The section dealing with false reports to peace officers or law enforce-
ment employees was amended to tighten up the language of the offense
and to expand the reach of the proscription. Section 37.08 of the Penal
Code criminalizes false statements made not only to peace officers con-
ducting criminal investigations but also to "any employee of a law en-
forcement agency that is authorized by the agency to conduct the
investigation and that the actor knows is conducting the investigation.' '1 33
(d) A person who [is] subject to prosecution under this section and any
other section of this code may be prosecuted under either or both sections.
Id. § 33.02(b), (d).
129. See id. §§ 33(A).02-.05.
130. See id.
131. See TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 33(A).06 (Vernon Supp. 1998).
132. Section 36.05(a) provides as follows:
(a) A person commits an offense if, with intent to influence the witness, he
offers, confers, or agrees to confer any benefit on a witness or prospective
witness in an official proceeding or coerces a witness or prospective witness
in an official proceeding:
(1) to testify falsely;
(2) to withhold any testimony, information, document, or thing;
(3) to elude legal process summoning him to testify or supply
evidence;
(4) to absent himself from an official proceeding to which he has
been legally summoned; or
(5) to abstain from, discontinue, or delay the prosecution of another.
Id. § 37.08(a) (emphasis added).
133. Section 37.08(a) provides as follows:
(a) A person commits an offense if, with intent to deceive, he knowingly




Section 37.09 was expanded to encompass tampering with or
fabricating physical evidence when a person knows that an offense has
been committed. 134 Prior law was limited to those situations in which a
person knew that an investigation or official proceeding was pending or
in progress. In addition, section 37.09(d)(2) provides that a person com-
mits an offense if the person observes human remains under circum-
stances under which a reasonable person would believe an offense has
been committed and should realize that a law enforcement agency is not
aware of the existence of or location of the remains but nevertheless fails
to report the existence and location of the remains to a law enforcement
agency. 135 The punishments attached to the various forms of criminal be-
havior were also modified in this section. 136
Newly enacted section 37.101 of the Penal Code addresses the fraudu-
lent filing of financing statements. The section provides that a person
commits an offense if the person "knowingly presents for filing or causes
to be presented for filing a financing statement that the person knows: (1)
is forged; (2) contains a material false statement; or (3) is groundless.' 1 37
The various forms of criminal conduct constitute a Class A misdemeanor
through a second-degree felony.138
The offense of impersonating a public servant was expanded by new
legislation. The offense now includes any person who "knowingly pur-
ports to exercise any function of a public servant or of a public office,
including that of a judge and court, and the position or office through
which he purports to exercise a function of a public servant or public
office has no lawful existence under the constitution or laws of this state
or of the United States. 1 39 The offense is a third-degree felony. 140
Newly enacted section 37.13 of the Penal Code (Record of a Fraudu-
lent Court) provides that a person commits a criminal offense
(1) a peace officer conducting the investigation; or
(2) any employee of a law enforcement agency that is authorized by
the agency to conduct the investigation and that the actor knows is con-
ducting the investigation.
Id. § 37.08(a).
134. Section 37.09(d) provides as follows:
(d) A person commits an offense if the person:
(1) knowing that an offense has been committed alters, destroys, or
conceals any record, document, or thing with intent to impair its verity, legi-
bility, or availability as evidence in any subsequent investigation of or official
proceeding related to the offense; or
(2) observes human remains under circumstances in which a reason-
able person would believe that an offense had been committed, knows or
reasonably should know that a law enforcement agency is not aware of the
existence of or location of the remains, and fails to report the existence of
and location of the remains to a law enforcement agency.
Id. § 37.09(d).
135. See id. § 37.09(d)(2).
136. See id. § 37.09(c).
137. Id. § 37.101(a).
138. See id. § 37.101(b).
139. Id. § 37.11(a).
140. See id. § 37.11(b).
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if the person makes, presents, or uses any document or other record
with:
(1) knowledge that the document or other record is not a record of
a court created under or established by the constitution or laws of
this state or of the United States; and
(2) the intent that the document or other record be given the same
legal effect as a record of a court created under or established by the
constitution or laws of this state or of the United States.1 41
The offense can be anywhere from a Class A misdemeanor to a third
degree felony, depending upon the prior criminal record of the defend-
ant.142 Subsection (c) enables prosecution of conduct which may also
constitute an offense under sections 32.48 or 37.10 of the Penal Code. 143
XIX. ABUSE OF OFFICE UNDER CHAPTER 39
Section 39.04 of the Penal Code (Violations of the Civil Rights of Per-
son in Custody; Improper Sexual Activity with Person in Custody) was
expanded to criminalize the conduct of an official or employee of a cor-
rectional facility or a peace officer who intentionally "engages in sexual
intercourse or deviate sexual intercourse with an individual in cus-
tody. '144 This newly created criminal offense is a state jail felony.145 The
Texas Attorney General has concurrent jurisdiction with law enforcement
agencies to investigate violations of section 39.04 of the Penal Code that
involve serious bodily injury or death.146
XX. DISORDERLY CONDUCT AND RELATED OFFENSES
UNDER CHAPTER 42
Section 42.071, the "Stalking Law" was repealed. 147 The new section
42.072 has been substantially revised.148 This section provides that a per-
son commits the criminal offense of stalking
if the person, on more than one occasion and pursuant to the same
scheme or course of conduct ... knowingly engages in conduct ...
that... the actor knows or reasonably believes the other person will
regard as threatening ... bodily injury or death ... or ... that an
offense will be committed against the other person's property; ...
causes the other person ... to be placed in fear of bodily injury or
death or fear that an offense will be committed against the other
person's property; and . . . would cause a reasonable person to fear
... bodily injury or death or that an offense would be committed
against the other person's property.' 49
141. Id. § 37.13(a).
142. See id. § 37.13(b).
143. See id. § 37.13(c).
144. Id. § 39.04(a)(2).
145. See id. § 39.04(b).
146. See id. § 39.04(d).
147. See id. § 42.071.
148. See id. § 42.072.
149. Id. § 42.072(a).
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Stalking is a Class A misdemeanor, and if the actor has been previously
convicted under this section, it becomes a third-degree felony.150
XXI. PUBLIC INDECENCY UNDER CHAPTER 43
Section 43.26 of the Penal Code remained largely the same, other than
an expansive definition of the "visual material" which is the subject mat-
ter of the child pornography. The definition attempted to incorporate
every type of computer image available. 151
XXII. WEAPONS UNDER CHAPTER 46
Section 46.02 was amended to eliminate all defensive matters relating
to the unlawful carrying of weapons. Newly amended section 46.15 of the
Penal Code has been expanded to incorporate all defenses previously
listed under section 46.02.152
In Birch v. State,153 where the appellant was convicted of unlawfully
carrying a handgun, the court readdressed the traveling defense. The
court emphasized that in reviewing the availability of this defense, appel-
late courts generally consider distance, time and mode of travel. 154 Ap-
pellant, a carpenter, drove from his home in Bexar County to his
girlfriend's house fifty-five miles away in San Marcos for her birthday
dinner, spent the night, and returned early the next morning, driving di-
rectly to his job site so as not to be late for work. Appellant worked all
day, ate, consumed several beers at the job site before driving home, a
distance of about ten miles, and began his trip home when he was
stopped by the police.
The court of appeals observed that the traveling defense is available
only if the accused had a legitimate, non-contrived purpose for carrying
the weapon, took a practical route, did not unduly or unreasonably devi-
ate from the route, and did not carry the weapon habitually. 155 The court
found that the traveling defense was raised by the evidence and that the
defensive instruction should have been submitted to the jury.156
150. See id. § 42.072(b).
151. Section 43.26(b)(3) provides:
(3) "Visual material" means:
(A) any film, photograph, videotape, negative, or slide or any photo-
graphic reproduction that contains or incorporates in any manner any film,
photograph, videotape, negative, or slide; or
(B) any disk, diskette, or other physical medium that allows an im-
age to be displayed on a computer or other video screen and any image
transmitted to a computer or other video screen by telephone line, cable,
satellite transmission, or other method.
Id. § 43.26(b)(3).
152. See id. § 46.15 (amending TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 46.02 (Vernon 1994)).
153. 948 S.W.2d 880 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1997, no pet. h.).
154. See id. at 882.
155. See id. at 884.
156. See id. at 885.
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XXIII. INTOXICATION AND ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES
OFFENSES UNDER CHAPTER 49
In Williams v. State,157 the defendant complained of the multiple use of
his two prior DWI convictions to render the DWI prosecution a felony.
The court, after comparing the similarity of the DWI statute to the felony
theft statute, held that the prosecution may reuse prior DWI convictions
to elevate the offense of DWI to a felony.158
XXIV. PURCHASE AND CONSUMPTION OF ALCOHOL BY
MINOR
A minor commits an offense if he purchases an alcoholic beverage.
159
A minor does not commit an offense, however, if he purchases the alco-
holic beverage under the immediate supervision of a commissioned peace
officer who is engaged in enforcing the provisions of the Alcoholic Bever-
age Code.' 60
In the text the Code was further amended to provide that
[a] minor may possess an alcoholic beverage:
(1) while in the course and scope of the minor's employment if the
minor is an employee of a licensee or permitee and the employment
is not prohibited by the code;
(2) if the minor is in the presence of an adult parent, guardian, or
spouse, or other adult to whom the minor has been committed by a
court; or
(3) if the minor is under the immediate supervision of a commis-
sioned peace officer engaged in enforcing the provisions of this
code.16'
Consumption of alcohol by a minor is also a crime.162 "It is an affirma-
tive defense to prosecution that the beverage was consumed in the visible
presence of the minor's adult parent, guardian, or spouse."'1 63
XXV. DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL BY
A MINOR
"A minor commits an offense if the minor operates a motor vehicle in a
public place while having any detectable amount of alcohol in the minor's
system."' 64 A first offense is generally a Class C misdemeanor. 65 In ad-
dition, "[a] person who takes a child into custody and who has reasonable
grounds to believe that the child has been operating a motor vehicle in a
public place while having any detectable amount of alcohol in the child's
157. 946 S.W.2d 886 (Tex. App.-Waco 1997, no pet. h.).
158. See id. at 895-99.
159. See TEX. ALCO. BEV. CODE ANN. § 106.02(a) (Vernon Supp. 1998).
160. See id.
161. Id. § 106.02(b)(5).
162. See id. § 106.04(a).
163. Id. § 106.04(b).
164. Id. § 106.041(a).
165. See id. § 106.041(b).
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system may ... take the child to a place to obtain a specimen of the
child's breath or blood [and] perform intoxilyzer processing and vide-
otaping of the child in an adult processing office of a police depart-
ment."'1 66 Concurrence of an attorney is not required if the request to
give the specimen and the child's response is videotaped.167 Certain in-
formation must be provided by the officer before requesting a
specimen. 168
XXVI. CIGARETTES AND TOBACCO PRODUCTS
"A person commits an offense if the person, with criminal negligence
... sells, gives, or causes to be sold or given a cigarette or tobacco product
to someone who is younger than [eighteen] years of age; or ... sells,
gives, or causes to be sold or given a cigarette or tobacco product to an-
other person who intends to deliver it to someone who is younger than
[eighteen] years of age."'169
"Each person who sells cigarettes or tobacco products at retail or by
vending machine shall post a sign in a location that is conspicuous to all
employees and customers and that is close to the place at which the ciga-
rettes or tobacco products may be purchased.' 70 The sign must include
specific language provided by statute. 171
Newly enacted legislation provides that an individual who is younger
than eighteen years of age commits an offense if he "(1) possesses,
purchases, consumes or accepts a cigarette or tobacco product; or (2)
falsely represents himself or herself to be [eighteen] years of age or older
by displaying proof of age that is false, [or] fraudulent.' 1 72 An exception
to this criminal prescription exists if the cigarette or tobacco product is
possessed in the presence of an adult parent, guardian or a spouse of the
individual.173
166. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 52.02(c) (Vernon Supp. 1998).
167. See id. § 52.02(d).
168. See TEX. TRANS. CODE ANN. § 724.015 (Vernon Supp. 1998).
169. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 161.082(a) (Vernon Supp. 1998).
170. Id. § 161.084(a).
171. See id. § 161.084(b).
172. Id. § 161.252(a).
173. See id. § 161.252(b).
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